In re

2000 Biennial Regulatory Review  )
Spectrum Aggregation Limits  )  WT Docket No. 01-14
for Commercial Mobile Radio Services  )

DECLARATION OF PETER CRAMTON

Qualifications

Introduction

Summary of Conclusions

I. The Potential Benefits of Maintaining the Spectrum Cap
   A. The Spectrum Cap Facilitates Entry by Innovative Carriers in the Mobile Telephony Market
      1. The First Leap Effect: Landline Displacement
      2. The Second Leap Effect: Lower Prices in Local Service Plans
   B. By Facilitating Entry, the Spectrum Cap Instills Price Discipline for Both Nationwide and Local Wireless Services
      1. The Price of Nationwide Plans Is Inversely Related to the Number of Distinct Carriers Offering Nationwide Plans
      2. The Price of Local Wireless Plans Is Inversely Related to the Number of Distinct Carriers in Each Geographic Market
   C. The Spectrum Cap is the Only Suitable Response to Excessive Concentration in an Ascending Auction
   D. The Spectrum Cap Encourages the Efficient Use of Spectrum
   E. The Spectrum Cap Can Increase Auction Revenues by Encouraging Greater Participation Among Entrants
   F. The Spectrum Cap Is the Best Available Policy for Achieving the Diversity Goals Set Forth in the Telecommunications Act
   G. The Spectrum Cap Undermines the Ability of Incumbent Carriers to Warehouse Spectrum

Declaration of Peter Cramton on behalf of Leap Wireless, April 13, 2001
II. The Alleged Benefits of Removing the Spectrum Cap
   A. The Claim That Removal of the Spectrum Cap Would Alleviate the Incumbent Carriers’ Capacity Constraint Is Vastly Overstated
   B. The Claim That Removal of the Spectrum Cap Would Restore the United States’ Position as World Leader of the Wireless Industry Is Illusory

III. Policy Considerations
   A. The Potential Benefits of Maintaining the Spectrum Cap Outweigh the Potential Benefits of Removing It
   B. The Commission Cannot Consider the Spectrum Cap in Isolation
      1. The Use of Wireless Affiliates Can Circumvent the Spectrum Cap
      2. The Department of Justice Cannot Be Relied Upon to Prevent Any Merger that Would Reduce Potential Competition

Conclusion

I, Peter Cramton, hereby declare as follows:

QUALIFICATIONS

1. My name is Peter Cramton. I am Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and President of Market Design Inc. I am expert on auctions, bargaining, and market exchange. Much of my recent work has applied this expertise to spectrum policy, the restructuring of infrastructure industries, and e-commerce. I previously was an Associate Professor at Yale University and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

2. With respect to spectrum management, I have served as the lead auction adviser in over twenty spectrum auctions for many clients. My auction practice is worldwide, including engagements in the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Austria, and Singapore. I have advised several foreign governments on the design and implementation of spectrum auctions.
3. From July 1997 to August 1998, I served as the U.S. Department of Justice’s expert in the matter of bid signaling in the FCC spectrum auctions. As part of this work I studied collusive bidding strategies in the FCC auctions, especially the DEF-block auction, which concluded January 1997. The analysis resulted in two research papers, as well as modification of the FCC auction rules. From November 1994 to November 1995, I advised the FCC on the design and implementation of spectrum auctions. During the first broadband PCS auction I advised the FCC on a daily basis with respect to bid increments and other aspects of auction implementation. I developed a tool to help the FCC and bidders track the progress of the auction. From July 1997 to December 1997, I advised the FCC on methods to improve the FCC auctions. In February 2000 I testified before the Senate Budget Committee on the lessons of the U.S. spectrum auction in general and the efficacy of the spectrum caps in particular.


5. I earned my B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University, and my Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.

6. I submit this declaration in my capacity as President of Market Design, Inc. and not on behalf of the University of Maryland.

_Declaration of Peter Cramton on behalf of Leap Wireless, April 13, 2001_
INTRODUCTION

7. I have been asked by Leap Wireless International, Inc. (“Leap”) to examine the competitive impact of removing the Federal Communications Commission’s Commercial Mobile Radio Services spectrum cap. Much of my declaration draws from my previous academic work and Senate testimony on the spectrum cap.¹ My support of the spectrum cap has not wavered.

8. A spectrum cap is a direct method of limiting the concentration of spectrum for a particular type of service in a particular area. Its advantage is that it is a bright-line test that is easy to enforce, both at the auction and in the aftermarket. In the United States, the spectrum cap has played a critical role in ensuring that there are many competitors for mobile wireless services in each market. This competition has led to clear gains for consumers in terms of lower prices and greater choices. In setting and revising spectrum caps, the Commission should err on the side of too stringent a cap. The Commission should consider the spectrum cap as a well-priced insurance policy, which guarantees the existence of a fourth competitor in each geographic market in the country.

9. Leap is the poster child illustrating the clear benefits of the spectrum cap. Removal of the cap would eliminate Leap’s chances of obtaining spectrum in the secondary spectrum market, and hence would deprive consumers in every market not yet served by Leap of the benefits of lower prices and greater choice. Unless the Commission believes that innovative

carriers such as Leap do not bring benefits to wireless consumers, it should not feel comfortable removing the spectrum cap.

**SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS**

10. In Part I of my declaration, I describe seven potential benefits of maintaining the cap. *First*, the spectrum cap facilitates entry by innovative carriers in the mobile telephony market. In particular, I show that the entry by Leap in a local market raises consumer welfare by (1) expanding the set of choices for wireless customers, and (2) lowering the prices of local plans.

11. *Second*, by facilitating entry, the spectrum cap instills price discipline for both nationwide and local wireless services. In particular, I demonstrate that (1) the price of nationwide plans is inversely related to the number of distinct carriers offering nationwide plans, and (2) the price of local wireless plans is inversely related to the number of distinct carriers in each geographic market.

12. *Third*, the spectrum cap is the only suitable response to excessive concentration in an ascending auction. *Fourth*, the spectrum cap encourages the efficient use of spectrum. *Fifth*, contrary to basic intuition, the spectrum cap can actually increase auction revenues. *Sixth*, the spectrum cap is the best available policy for achieving the diversity goals set forth in the Telecommunications Act. *Seventh*, the spectrum cap undermines the ability of incumbent carriers to warehouse spectrum.

13. In Part II, I debunk the two purported benefits offered by those in favor of removing the cap. Spectrum cap opponents might claim that the cap limits a carrier’s ability to offer data services. But wireless systems can be made sufficiently efficient that even the most
intense data services can be provided under the 45 MHz cap. Spectrum cap opponents also argue that, if U.S. carriers cannot aggregate spectrum in excess of the spectrum cap, U.S. national interests would be threatened vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Although most economists would scoff at such nationalistic arguments, I devote a (short) section to debunking that myth as well.

14. In Part III, I explain that the benefits of maintaining the cap exceed the benefits of removing it. I also explain why the Commission cannot consider the cap in isolation of other policies, such as the Commission’s own policy toward the use of bidding fronts and the Department of Justice’s policy toward wireless mergers.

I. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MAINTAINING THE SPECTRUM CAP

15. In this Part of my declaration, I lay out the potential benefits of maintaining the spectrum cap. I demonstrate that the gains associated with each benefit are substantial and the likelihood that each benefit will materialize is significant.

A. The Spectrum Cap Facilitates Entry by Innovative Carriers in the Mobile Telephony Market

16. A total of 180 MHz of spectrum designated for wireless services is subject to the 45/55 MHz spectrum cap—namely the 120 MHz of broadband Personal Communications Services (PCS) spectrum, 50 MHz of cellular spectrum, and 10 MHz of attributable SMR spectrum.\(^2\) It is no accident that 180 MHz divided by 45 MHz maximum per carrier is four distinct carriers. Stated differently, the spectrum cap serves as an insurance policy for the Commission, which guarantees (at least) four distinct carriers in each geographic market. In this

\(^2\) See, e.g Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, GN Dkt. No. 93-252, Third Report and Order, 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 7988, 8112-14, at ¶¶ 270-75 (1994);
section, I demonstrate that the presence in a local market of a non-traditional wireless carrier such as Leap generates significant consumer welfare benefits in terms of expanded choices and lower prices.

1. The First Leap Effect: Landline Displacement

17. The benefits from adding a non-traditional competitor such as Leap in a geographic market are greater than the benefits from adding a traditional wireless carrier. Nationwide wireless carriers that own landline networks such as Verizon and Cingular have yet to offer wireless plans that compete directly with those wireline networks.³ To do so would risk cannibalizing revenues from those wireline properties. Because non-traditional carriers such as Leap do not have rents to protect in complementary markets, their entry into a particular geographic market expands the set of choices for consumers, and thus increases consumer welfare. Moreover, Leap is appealing to a broader segment of consumers, many of whom have lower income, and cannot afford (nor value highly) some of the options that are implicit in the incumbents’ wireless plans.

18. Leap’s major innovation in the wireless industry is its unique flat rate, all-you-can-talk offerings. Marketed under the name Cricket, Leap offers a service that allows customers to make all their local calls from within their home service area and receive calls from anywhere for one low, flat rate.⁴ For example, Cricket charges customers in Chattanooga and Nashville $29.95 per month to make and receive an unlimited number of local calls. The service is

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designed to compete with local wireline service.\textsuperscript{5} Leap currently offers its innovative Cricket service in markets stretching from Salt Lake City, Utah to Charlotte, North Carolina. Leap currently owns or has rights to acquire licenses covering approximately one-quarter of the U.S. population or 72.6 million potential customers (1998 population) in 36 states. As of December 31, 2000, Leap reported more than 190,000 Cricket customers.\textsuperscript{6} The rapid success enjoyed by the Cricket plan demonstrates the public’s thirst for its innovative offering, and the social utility derived from its existence.

19. Cricket also offers voicemail, caller ID, and call waiting for a small monthly rate. Hence, Cricket customers enjoy full mobility wherever they use their phone, and save money relative to a substitute bundle of voicemail, caller ID, call waiting, and local service from a landline operator. For example, a comparison of prices in Chattanooga, Tennessee reveals that BellSouth’s residential landline package that includes unlimited local service, caller id, voicemail, and call waiting is $7.46 more expensive than Leap’s comparable bundle of local wireless service ($44.95 versus $37.49).\textsuperscript{7}

20. The introduction of Leap’s innovative Cricket service has induced many customers to substitute their wireline phone with their wireless phone:

- 61 percent of Leap’s customers are using the wireless service as their primary phone, accounting for an average of 1,000 minutes of use (“MOUs”) each month, while the other 39 percent are using it as a second phone line;\textsuperscript{8}

- 7 percent of Leap’s customers have completely disconnected their landline phone as a result of taking the Cricket service;\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{5} Affordable, Flat-Rate Cricket Wireless Service Launches in Nashville, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 31, 2000.
\textsuperscript{6} Id.
\textsuperscript{7} Information downloaded from BellSouth’s web site at http://bsol.bellsouthonline.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+ProductPageAppLogic?applDomain=conscatalog&appName=consumer&location=423855&pc=APWCC_.
• Nearly half of Leap’s customers take Cricket either as a complete replacement of landline service or as a replacement for a second or third line to the home;\textsuperscript{10}

• 86 percent of Leap’s customers use their Cricket phone at home compared to 35 percent for traditional wireless;\textsuperscript{11}

• 53 percent of Leap’s customers report that they have displaced a significant portion of their landline usage with Cricket compared to 6 percent for traditional wireless;\textsuperscript{12}

• 70 percent of Leap’s customers are either completely new to wireless or coming back to wireless after a long-term disconnect (defined as greater than 3 months);\textsuperscript{13}

• 58 percent of Leap’s customers in Tulsa report that they use Cricket as their primary phone;\textsuperscript{14}

• 60 percent of Leap’s customers in Salt Lake City report that they use Cricket as their primary phone;\textsuperscript{15}

The high degree of substitution from wireline to wireless in Leap’s markets reveals that consumers have benefited tremendously from the introduction of those plans.

21. The Commission itself has recognized “wireless/wireline competition” as “a major operational trend” in both the Fourth Report\textsuperscript{16} and Fifth Report\textsuperscript{17} on the state of wireless competition:

   In the past year, mobile telephone carriers, and most often broadband PCS operators, have begun to use a variety of methods to target homes with wireline-based second telephone lines. This strategy is especially prevalent among broadband PCS operators with licenses in rural or smaller urban areas. . . .

Because the digital technology used by broadband PCS systems can replicate

\begin{itemize}
\item[9.] Internal Leap estimate.
\item[10.] Id.
\item[11.] YANKEE GROUP, 1999 MOBILE USER SURVEY (released February 2000).
\item[12.] Id.
\item[13.] Internal Leap estimate.
\item[14.] LEAP WIRELESS, TULSA CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY 2000 (sample size of 300 customers).
\item[15.] LEAP WIRELESS, SALT LAKE CITY CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY 2000 (sample size of 300 customers).
\item[16.] Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Fourth Report (released June 24, 1999), at 12 [hereinafter FOURTH REPORT].
\item[17.] Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Fifth Report (released Aug. 18, 2000), at 14 [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT].
\end{itemize}
many of the features of wireline phones and analog cellular networks cannot, many broadband PCS operators in these areas are promoting their services as replacements for second telephone lines in homes or businesses.\textsuperscript{18}

The innovative services offered by Leap not only represent “wireless attacking the second line,”\textsuperscript{19} as the Commission recently coined the phenomenon, but wireless attacking the first line as well.

2. The Second Leap Effect: Lower Prices in Local Service Plans

The second benefit to consumers in markets where Leap has entered (“Leap markets”) is lower prices for local service plans. In particular, I have calculated the decline in local prices in several Leap markets. Table 1 shows the Leap markets and the date on which Leap began offering wireless service (“launch date”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Launch Date</th>
<th>Top 100 MSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chattanooga, TN</td>
<td>6/1/99</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
<td>1/31/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Knoxville, TN</td>
<td>10/25/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Memphis, TN</td>
<td>11/15/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Greensboro, NC</td>
<td>11/29/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Columbia (Nashville Expansion)</td>
<td>11/30/00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Clarksville, TN</td>
<td>11/30/00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tulsa, OK</td>
<td>11/30/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tucson, AZ</td>
<td>12/7/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Charlotte, NC</td>
<td>12/8/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Little Rock, AR</td>
<td>12/13/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hot Springs, AR</td>
<td>12/13/00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Salt Lake City/Ogden, UT</td>
<td>12/14/00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Provo, UT</td>
<td>12/14/00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Albuquerque, NM</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Santa Fe, NM</td>
<td>2/14/01</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Wichita, KS</td>
<td>2/28/01</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} Leap Wireless internal data.

As the shaded portion of Table 1 shows, Leap entered 14 markets between June 1999 and December 2000.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{FOURTH REPORT, supra} note 16, at 12.
23. For ten of those markets, I examined the wireless local service plans for the incumbent landline operator as of the fourth quarter 1998 and the first quarter 2001. For example, the incumbent landline operator in Chattanooga, Tennessee is BellSouth, while the incumbent landline operator in Tulsa, Oklahoma is SBC. Conditional on the market being in the top 100 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), pricing plan data for fourth quarter 1998 was available from Kagan Associates. Pricing plan data for first-quarter 2001 was obtained from company web sites during the last week of March 2001. I computed the percent decrease in the price of a 1000-minute local wireless plan—somewhat less than the average MOU of Leap customers—for each incumbent landline operator. My hypothesis is that, because Leap offers a service that competes directly with landline telephony, the presence of Leap induces a large wireless price reduction among landline operators. Table 2 shows the results.

TABLE 2: PRICE DECLINE FOR 1000-MINUTE LOCAL WIRELESS PLAN IN LEAP MARKETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Name</th>
<th>Original Plan</th>
<th>Current Plan</th>
<th>Q4--1998 Price</th>
<th>Q1--2001 Price</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
<td>BellSouth</td>
<td>Cingular</td>
<td>$95.00</td>
<td>$69.99</td>
<td>-26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattanooga, TN</td>
<td>BellSouth</td>
<td>Cingular</td>
<td>$137.50</td>
<td>$69.99</td>
<td>-49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson, AZ</td>
<td>AirTouch (US West)</td>
<td>Qwest</td>
<td>$121.95</td>
<td>$74.99</td>
<td>-38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulsa, OK</td>
<td>SBC</td>
<td>Cingular</td>
<td>$162.45</td>
<td>$87.49</td>
<td>-46.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock, AR</td>
<td>SBC</td>
<td>Cingular</td>
<td>$202.50</td>
<td>$87.49</td>
<td>-56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greensboro, NC</td>
<td>GTE</td>
<td>Verizon</td>
<td>$102.00</td>
<td>$75.00</td>
<td>-26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT</td>
<td>AirTouch (US West)</td>
<td>Qwest</td>
<td>$120.00</td>
<td>$74.99</td>
<td>-37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, TN</td>
<td>BellSouth</td>
<td>Cingular</td>
<td>$95.00</td>
<td>$69.99</td>
<td>-26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte-Gastonia, NC</td>
<td>Bell Atlantic</td>
<td>Verizon</td>
<td>$144.99</td>
<td>$89.99</td>
<td>-37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville, TN</td>
<td>GTE</td>
<td>Verizon</td>
<td>$102.00</td>
<td>$72.50</td>
<td>-28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-37.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. *Id.*
20. Pre-2001 pricing data was available only for ten of the 14 markets that Leap entered in 1999 and 2000. I therefore used only those markets in my comparison. Because the smaller market excluded from my comparison tended to have fewer competitors prior to Leaps entry, the exclusion of these markets would if anything tend to understate the “Leap Effect.”
22. I assumed that 75 percent of the minutes in the plan were used during peak hours.
As Table 2 shows, the average price decrease in the Leap markets during the 18-month study period for a 1000-minute wireless plan offer by a landline operator was 37.4 percent.

24. Because the spectrum cap enables Leap to acquire spectrum in the secondary market, removal of the spectrum cap would risk eliminating the price effect created by Leap when it enters a market. Stated differently, the spectrum cap prevents a few dominant carriers from precluding (by acquiring all the available spectrum) Leap’s entry into a market. Likewise, the spectrum cap facilitates entry at the margins: by eliminating certain incumbents that are at or near the limit from competing for spectrum in the secondary market, the spectrum cap lowers the expected price that Leap would pay for spectrum on the secondary market, and hence facilitates its entry in those markets. The Commission must determine whether consumers would be better off when an incumbent carrier expands its in-region spectrum holdings beyond 45 MHz, or when new carriers such as Leap enter the market, offer innovative services, and exert pricing pressures.

B. By Facilitating Entry, the Spectrum Cap Instills Price Discipline for Both Nationwide and Local Wireless Services

25. A first principle of microeconomics is that entry drives prices toward average costs.23 The early oligopoly models of competition were subsequently reinforced by game-theoretic models, which consider the interactive decision-making among individual firms. The newer models of competition offer a better understanding of how entry undermines coordinated pricing, and hence lowers prices relative to the monopoly price.24 Whether old-fashioned or

high-tech, economic theory predicts that prices of a particular service are inversely related to the number of suppliers of that service.

26. In addition to established theory, new empirical investigation documents the effect of entry on prices in mobile telephony. By analyzing panel data of mobile telephony prices in 23 countries from 1991 through 1997, Drs. Oliver Boylaud and Giuseppe Nicoletti of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) determine that a 10 percent increase in the market share of new entrants reduces mobile prices by 8.6 percent when controlling for all other factors that may influence mobile prices.\textsuperscript{25} Stated differently, a country that encourages entry will enjoy lower wireless prices than will a country that protects its wireless incumbents.

27. The inverse relationship between prices and number of operators is borne out by the statistical evidence in the wireless industry within the United States as well. According to the Fifth Report, as the number of operational carriers in each market (BTA) increased on average from 2.2 to 4.5, wireless prices declined 11.3 percent in 2000 and 20 percent in 1999.\textsuperscript{26} In fact, the Commission subscribes to the theory that entry in the wireless market has lowered wireless prices: “However, a number of reports and other available data indicate that the entrance of new competitors into this market continues to reduce prices.”\textsuperscript{27} The Commission concludes that “competition is continuing to make mobile telephone services more affordable for all Americans.”\textsuperscript{28} I believe that the Commission was correct in its assessment.

\textsuperscript{26} Fifth Report, supra note 17, at 4.
\textsuperscript{27} Id. at 18.
\textsuperscript{28} Id. at 18.
28. There are two major types of plans that are offered by wireless carriers: nationwide one-rate plans and local plans. In the sections that follow, I demonstrate that the price of each rate plan is inversely related to the number of carriers offering that plan. To the extent that the spectrum cap would reduce the number of distinct carriers in a given market, removal of the plan would result in higher prices.

1. The Price of Nationwide Plans Is Inversely Related to the Number of Distinct Carriers Offering Nationwide Plans

29. One major rate plan offered by a handful of wireless providers is the nationwide one-rate plan. AT&T was first to offer this plan in May 1998, and was followed by Verizon (September 1998), SprintPCS (September 1998), VoiceStream (March 2000), and SBC (June 2000). The nationwide one-rate plan allows customers to make long-distance calls and to roam outside of their home territory at no additional charges. According to the Fifth Report, the two most prominent mobile telephone mergers announced during 1999—Vodafone-AirTouch and Bell Atlantic-GTE—involveld “large regional operators seeking to create nationwide footprints in order to compete effectively with existing operators offering attractive nationwide pricing plans.”

30. Because the price of the nationwide one-rate plans do not vary across local markets, those prices are more likely to depend on the number of carriers offering nationwide one-rate plans across the country. The price effect of entry by carriers offering nationwide one-rate plans has been substantial. When AT&T originally introduced its nationwide plan in May 1998, the minimum commitment required from customers was $89 per month. By mid 2000, consumers wishing to subscribe to a nationwide plan only needed to commit to $19 per month.

29. Id. at 4.
with Sprint PCS’s or $35 per month with Verizon Wireless.\(^\text{30}\) The Commission itself recognized that “there is some evidence that the addition of new nationwide operators already may be contributing to decreasing prices.”\(^\text{31}\)

\(^{30}\) By limiting spectrum aggregation at the local level, the spectrum cap facilitates carriers that are trying to establish a nationwide footprint. Suppose, for example, that a carrier’s spectrum holdings covers the entire nation except for one major BTA such as New York or Los Angeles. The spectrum cap prevents established nationwide one-rate providers from acquiring all the spectrum in one or more critical markets, such that they deny access to a carrier (for example, Cingular or VoiceStream) that needs to fill a crucial hole in its nationwide footprint. Likewise, the spectrum cap facilitates entry at the margins, by reducing the number of potential spectrum buyers among established providers, and thereby lowering the price of spectrum to new entrants.

\(^{31}\) It is interesting to note the effect of the second, third, fourth, and fifth nationwide service provider on AT&T’s nationwide one-rate pricing plan. Figure 1 plots the monthly price that AT&T charged for 650, 1100, and 1500 minutes since it introduced its nationwide one-rate plan in May 1998.

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31. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 17, at 11.
FIGURE 1: AT&T's Monthly Nationwide One-Rate Prices Are Inversely Related to the Number of Nationwide Carriers


Note that AT&T did not reduce its nationwide one-rate pricing plan when Bell Atlantic (the second entrant) and Sprint PCS (the third entrant) offered competing plans in September 1998. AT&T again found it unnecessary to reduce the price of its nationwide one-rate plan when VoiceStream (the fourth entrant) offered its version of a nationwide plan in March 2000. Not until SBC (the fifth entrant) entered the nationwide pricing arena in June 2000 did AT&T finally reduce its nationwide pricing plan by 22 percent (for 650 minutes) and by 14 percent (for 1,500 minutes).
minutes). This finding suggests that, if the number of nationwide carriers were reduced to two or three—a result that would obtain if the spectrum cap were removed—the rate of decline in the price of nationwide plans would slow or potentially reverse.

2. The Price of Local Wireless Plans Is Inversely Related to the Number of Distinct Carriers in Each Geographic Market

A second type of rate plan offered by wireless providers is local rate plans. For a significant segment of the population, local service plans are preferred to nationwide plans. For example, for a family with low-income or an individual that seldom travels or a teenager that desires a separate phone line, the value of roaming is small, and thus a local plan would suffice. This notion is supported by the fact that every major wireless carrier offers a local service plan. Hence, it is erroneous to suggest that consolidation in one particular geographic location would not affect wireless prices—while nationwide pricing plans might be unaffected by the local consolidation, local pricing plans would certainly adjust upward.

34. To track the decline in local wireless prices, the Commission relies on the cellular telephone services component of the Consumer Price Index (“Cellular CPI”) produced by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because the Cellular CPI is based on local calling plans, it is possible to examine the correlation between entry at the local level and local pricing. Figure 2 shows the decline in the Cellular CPI from December 1997 through December 2000, and the increase in the average number of local operators over the same period.

32. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 17, at 20.
33. HOW BLS MEASURES PRICE CHANGE FOR CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICE IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, downloaded from BLS web site at http://stats.bls.gov/cpifactc.htm (“The weight for cellular telephone services reflects monthly consumer expenditures for local cellular services received from telephone companies.”) To the extent that the more recent wireless prices in this survey include any nationwide pricing data—that is, data derived from plans that actually offer a superior product—the survey’s estimate of the price for local cellular services in 2000 are actually upwardly biased, and thus would tend to substantiate the claim that local prices are falling with entry at the local level.

Declaration of Peter Cramton on behalf of Leap Wireless, April 13, 2001
As Figure 2 shows, the Cellular CPI steadily declined since December 1997. Over the same time period, the average number of wireless carriers across all basic trading areas (BTAs) has been rising. According to the *Third Report*, there were on average 1.8 wireless operators across all BTAs as of mid-year 1998. According to the *Fourth Report*, there were on average 2.2 wireless operators across all BTAs as of mid-year 1998. According to the *Fifth Report*, there were on average


35. *FOURTH REPORT*, supra note 16, at Table 2A, B-3.
average 4.5 wireless operators across all BTAs as of mid-year 2000.\textsuperscript{36} As Figure 2 shows, the rate of decrease in the price of local-calling plans has not slowed with the entry of the third or fourth carrier. Because the spectrum cap ensures the existence of a third and fourth local provider in each local service area, removal of the cap would slow the rate of decline in local service prices or potentially cause a reversal in the decline altogether.

C. The Spectrum Cap is the Only Suitable Response to Excessive Concentration in an Ascending Auction

35. If concentration is viewed as a potential problem going into an auction, then spectrum caps, rather than case-by-case review, must be used, because only caps can provide an instantaneous determination of what is allowed and what is not. Such a rapid response is essential in a simultaneous ascending auction. Bids must be binding commitments until they are topped. Hence, at every point in the auction, the bidders must know what is allowed and what is not. Only a spectrum cap can provide this immediate certainty.

36. Suppose that instead of spectrum caps, the Commission were to employ an \textit{ex ante} declaratory ruling over the legitimacy of certain post-auction allocations. Clearly such a scheme would be futile because bidders would have to reveal their bidding strategy to opponents in order to gain approval to compete in specific geographic market. Moreover, the ruling would be subject to intense lobbying by petitioners that could delay the allocation, which would translate into losses in consumer welfare.

37. Other schemes to alleviate concentration after the auction—such as allowing a winning bidder to renege on its bids in the event that the post-auction market is overly concentrated—would also undermine the integrity of the auction. The beauty of the FCC’s

\textsuperscript{36} \textsc{Fifth Report}, \textit{supra} note 17, at Table 2B, B-3.
simultaneous ascending auction is the price discovery that it allows. Price discovery is destroyed if bids can later be reneged on. Bids must represent binding commitments by bidders. A single reneged bid can alter numerous prices and, and hence undermine the efficiency of the process. Hence, in my opinion, the spectrum cap is the only suitable response to excessive concentration in an ascending auction.

D. The Spectrum Cap Encourages the Efficient Use of Spectrum

38. The amount of spectrum required by a carrier can vary largely depending on the technology and architecture of its network. Some technologies deliver far higher system capacity than others. According to Mark Kelly, the Chief Technical Officer of Leap, the same capacity that could be served using 5 MHz of spectrum on a CDMA 95 A/E VRC system (the most advanced current (2000-2001) technology available) would theoretically require 9 MHz of spectrum on a CDMA 95 system, or 17 MHz of spectrum on a TDMA system, 43 MHz of spectrum on a GSM system, and 143 MHz of spectrum on an AMPS system. Hence, a carrier’s need for spectrum is largely dependent upon the technology it uses.

39. Markets can generally be relied upon to induce the efficient use of inputs. For example, if firm A can use an input more efficiently than the current owner, firm B, of that input, then a transfer of the that input from firm B to firm A will typically occur. But if inefficient usage of that input stymies entry by all competitors and thereby artificially inflates the profits of firm B, then the market might not guarantee a socially desirable outcome. Only if firm B is prevented, through competition, from extracting an anticompetitive profit can the market be relied upon to force the efficient use of resources. Thus, competition among rivals drives operators to use inputs such as spectrum efficiently. Drs. Boylaud and Nicoletti of the OECD
find that entry and the development of competition leads to higher productivity and greater service quality across the 23 countries in their sample.\textsuperscript{38} To the extent that removal of the spectrum cap would lower competition, incumbent carriers would have a smaller incentive to use spectrum efficiently.

40. By contrast, retention of the spectrum cap will induce carriers to use spectrum more efficiently. In particular, carriers will more likely convert outdated equipment more rapidly, and invest in capacity-enhancing technologies early. The benefits of efficient use of spectrum and capacity-enhancing technologies will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, greater coverage, and more services. Because spectrum is scarce, it is vital that every MHz of spectrum be used efficiently—the spectrum cap promotes the efficient use of spectrum by wireless carriers.

E. The Spectrum Cap Can Increase Auction Revenues by Encouraging Greater Participation Among Entrants

41. Spectrum caps are often thought to lower auction revenues because they limit the participation of incumbent bidders. Although it may seem counter-intuitive, a spectrum cap can actually increase auction revenues by encouraging greater participation in the auction among entrants. In particular, when incumbent bidders have an advantage—for example, lower incremental cost to build out a network or greater brand name recognition—a spectrum cap may actually increase revenues and promote efficiency. Because the incumbent would be likely to win under those conditions, removal of the spectrum cap may induce non-incumbents to never participate in the auction, knowing that their participation (which is costly in terms of

\textsuperscript{37} Declaration of Mark Kelley on behalf of Leap Wireless (filed Apr. 13, 2001).
\textsuperscript{38} Boylaud & Nicol, \textit{supra} note 25, at 19.
management resources) would be futile. As a result, only incumbents participate in the auction, competition is lessened, and the incumbents split the licenses up among themselves at low prices.

42. With the introduction of a spectrum cap, a non-incumbent bidder knows that some non-incumbents will win licenses, which provides the incentive and ability to secure the needed financing from capital markets. The result is a competitive auction with market-determined prices. Although this situation may seem special, I believe it is a realistic case. Empirical examples are seen in the European 3G auctions. For example, the U.K. auction achieved such remarkable revenues precisely because it was known that at least one new entrant would be successful. Nine new entrants competed vigorously for the license set aside for new entrants. In contrast, in the Dutch 3G auction, there were five incumbents and five licenses. Prices were only a small fraction of the U.K. prices, because no strong new entrant bid in the auction. This phenomenon of depressed prices also has occurred in some U.S. auctions, where the new entrants have been rationally pessimistic about their chance of success. In other U.S. auctions, where entrants believe there is a reasonable chance of securing the needed spectrum, entry is robust and auction prices reflect market values.

F. The Spectrum Cap Is the Best Available Policy for Achieving the Diversity Goals Set Forth in the Telecommunications Act

43. On balance, the best policy for achieving the diversity goals of the Telecommunications Act is the use of spectrum caps to guarantee new entry where desirable. Less attractive alternatives to spectrum caps include the use of bidding credits, set-asides, or installment payments. My reason for this conclusion has to do with the practical difficulties of effectively implementing favors for designated entities.
44. The spectrum cap leads to greater diversity in service plans for every geographic area by limiting the amount of spectrum any traditional wireless carrier can aggregate. Wireless consumers benefit when the set of wireless choices expands. Moreover, as wireless products become more differentiated, any attempt by incumbent wireless carriers to coordinate on wireless prices is undermined. Unlike most affirmative action policies, the spectrum cap achieves the diversity objective without conditioning outcomes on a carrier’s business characteristics.

45. The Commission has used bidding credits, set-asides, and installment payments to encourage the participation and success of designated entities. The favored treatment can serve to “level the playing field,” and thereby foster innovation and intensify competition. Although this is a valid point, and has empirical support, the theory of promoting diversity through favored treatment of certain entities has proven difficult in its implementation. A vivid example is seen in the initial C-block broadband PCS auction. (Other disappointing auctions were IVDS and WCS, but none have involved the economic loss incurred in the C-block auction.) That auction failed largely because of overly attractive installment payments—namely, 10 percent downpayment and 6-year interest-only at the risk-free 10-year Treasury rate. The payment plan encouraged speculative bidding, which led to each major bidder defaulting and declaring bankruptcy. Installment payments were a bad idea, because they favored the bidders with the most speculative business plans. In addition, installment payments put the Commission in the role of


banker, an activity for which it has no comparative advantage. Since the C-block experience, the Commission no longer offers installment payments.

46. The two other instruments to favor designated entities—set-asides and bidding credits—may be desirable but also are difficult to administer. The typical situation is one where the government is attempting to encourage competition in the auction and the post-auction market for wireless services. By leveling the playing field between incumbents and new entrants, competition may be enhanced. Still, set-asides and bidding credits have potential problems in their implementation. Gauging the right level of set-asides or bidding credits is extremely difficult. In addition, the creation of fronts, carefully constructed to satisfy the rules but circumvent their intent, has been a constant problem in the U.S. spectrum auctions.

47. To summarize, the spectrum cap is the easiest diversity program to administer because it represents a bright-line test that can be evaluated in an objective fashion before the auction. Moreover, the spectrum cap achieves the diversity objectives outlined by Congress in the Telecommunications Act without conditioning spectrum allocations on a carrier’s business characteristics.

G. The Spectrum Cap Undermines the Ability of Incumbent Carriers to Warehouse Spectrum

48. Incumbent carriers can acquire spectrum for pro-competitive and anti-competitive reasons. Pro-competitive reasons for acquiring spectrum include the desire to use it immediately, or the option value of using that spectrum if and when future demand requires it. For example, a carrier with 30 MHz in a license area that is currently using 20 MHz of spectrum could acquire an additional 10 MHz if it believed that demand for bandwidth in that license area would increase by more than 50 percent.
49. An anti-competitive reason for acquiring spectrum is to realize the incremental profit by denying entry of a new carrier in the license area.\(^{41}\) Because that incremental profit derived from foreclosing competition is shared across all incumbent carriers in that license area, the gains from warehousing for anti-competitive reasons would be shared across carriers in proportion to their share of subscribers in that region. Hence, an incumbent carrier with only 10 percent of the subscribers in the license area would be less willing to engage in warehousing for anti-competitive reasons than would an incumbent with 50 percent of the subscribers in the license area. But a carrier with a significant share of the market might stand to gain sufficient “rents” to offset and overshadow its opportunity cost from holding the fallow spectrum. In fact, such “strategic” considerations may have motivated some bidding behavior in Auction \#35.\(^{42}\) Moreover, an incumbent carrier may be reluctant to incur large switching costs to make its network more efficient. If the gains from not upgrading the network (equal to the out-of-pocket costs of upgrading the network plus the increased pro-rata share of rents from less competition) exceed the gains from upgrading the network (from greater capacity), then the incumbent carrier is not likely to use the most efficient technology. Because incumbent carriers are limited in their ability to warehouse spectrum by the spectrum cap, removal of the spectrum cap would only exacerbate this problem.

\(^{41}\) I have previously demonstrated in this declaration that maintaining fewer competitors allows the realization of anticompetitive profits.

\(^{42}\) See, e.g., Steve Labaton, *Big Companies Prove Winners in Airwave Bids*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, at A1 (“But if you look at the long-term strategic value of having a lot of spectrum in New York, that’s a different thing. If they have the money to do it, it may be the right move as a longer-term investment,” quoting Eric Kintz, a partner at Roland Berger). See also Mark Wigfield, *FCC Auction of Wireless Licenses Raises a Record $17 Billion So Far*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2001, at B5 (“Indeed, Verizon's aggressive stance apparently drove most of the competition out of the New York bidding, including Cingular Wireless, the joint venture of SBC Communications Inc. and BellSouth Corp.”)
II. THE ALLEGED BENEFITS OF REMOVING THE SPECTRUM CAP

50. In this Part of my declaration, I examine the alleged gains associated with the removal of the spectrum cap. In particular, I examine the claims of capacity constraints imposed by the cap and arguments based on economic nationalism. I conclude that neither claim deserves serious consideration, and even if they did, would not offset the gains associated with retaining the cap.

A. The Claim That Removal of the Spectrum Cap Would Alleviate the Incumbent Carriers’ Capacity Constraint Is Vastly Overstated

51. Some incumbent carriers claim that they require additional spectrum to support wireless data applications. This claimed benefit of removing the spectrum cap is likely to be overstated for at least two reasons. First, holding the amount of spectrum fixed, wireless operators can increase capacity by investing in equipment.

52. Second, the data applications in question use a scant amount of spectrum compared to voice calls. Mobile wireless data applications deployed during the past 2-3 years around the world include short message services (SMS) and Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) text browsing. Some carriers allow full Internet access of all available content (such as the i-mode service from DoCoMo in Japan). According to Mark Kelley, the Chief Technical Officer of Leap, a typical phone call requires the transmission of the equivalent of about 400 text messages, but even the heaviest SMS users send approximately 5 to 10 messages per hour during periods of peak usage.43 With respect to the spectrum demands caused by wireless Internet, Kelley reports that DoCoMo’s i-mode technology uses a 9.6 kbps data speed. Because a voice telephone call using a standard digital handset requires about 4 kbps, Kelley explains, system

43. Kelley Declaration, supra note 37, at 5.
capacity required by DoCoMo’s Internet application is only slightly more than the capacity required by two simultaneous phone calls.\textsuperscript{44}

53. With respect to future data applications, Kelley demonstrates that a 2-minute video clip or a 3-minute MP3 quality song each will take about 3 Mbits of data. A single 3-sector site will supply 12 Mbps in each 5 MHz of spectrum, which is sufficient to supply 400 simultaneous users of streaming content at 30 kbps. Hence over 70 percent of the population in the coverage area simultaneously could use high bandwidth applications.\textsuperscript{45} Based on those calculations, I conclude that the incumbents’ claims of spectrum shortage for data applications are probably exaggerated.

\textbf{B. The Claim That Removal of the Spectrum Cap Would Restore the United States’ Position as World Leader of the Wireless Industry Is Illusory}

54. Opponents of the spectrum cap also justify their position by appealing to arguments of economic nationalism. For example, Tom Wheeler, President and CEO of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, incorrectly believes that the United State’s prosperity depends on its “competitiveness” on world markets:

Our international competitors know how to use government to create a competitive advantage. For instance, in the 1960’s Charles DeGaulle determined to make the French railway and subway industry into a world leader. His means of accomplishing this was to pour government dollars into rebuilding the Paris metro. It worked, and the French soon dominated the world market.

Our European and Asian competitor countries are doing something similar, today. This time, instead of tracks and tunnels, it’s spectrum. By making spectrum available they are priming the pump for the entrepreneurs at a time when the world leader, the U.S., is just beginning to recognize the well might be running dry.

\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 6.
\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 6.
Many called the 1980’s the “American Decade” for wireless. The 90’s, however, belonged to the Europeans. Now, the race is on to see which nation will lead the first decade of the 21st Century and reap the rewards.46

According to Mr. Wheeler, the world economy is characterized by win-lose competition, in which the success of any one country must come at another country’s expense.  

55. Different variations on this theme have been used by corporate lobbyists to promote a broad range of (ill-conceived) industrial policies including U.S. support for high-definition television, Japanese targeting of steel, European support of aircraft, and Japanese targeting of semi-conductors. Serious economic scholars have exposed the flaws in the “strategic trade theories.”47 First, growth in other countries not only increases competition for U.S. exports, but also increases domestic real income. Second, government assistance to one industry necessarily implies neglect (or taxation) of another and it is impossible to identify ex ante that some industries are more socially desirable than others. Even a “high-technology” industry such as mobile telephony might not justify strategic trade policy—the question of the appropriate level of subsidy depends on the expected size of the technological spillover, which is nearly impossible to estimate.

56. In summary, the objective of the Commission should not be to bolster our competitive position vis-à-vis the world wireless market. Furthermore, it is erroneous in any event to assert that the spectrum cap is restraining U.S. wireless service growth, innovation or competitiveness relative to other countries. To the contrary, retention of the cap fosters these goals by stimulating competition and the efficient use of the spectrum.


III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Potential Benefits of Maintaining the Spectrum Cap Outweigh the Potential Benefits of Removing It

57. I have outlined seven significant benefits associated with maintaining the spectrum cap. In addition, I have discredited the only two plausible benefits claimed by those who favor removing the cap. The Commission should perform a similar cost-benefit analysis. Only if the Commission believes that the benefits from removing the cap outweigh the benefits of maintaining the cap, should the Commission remove the spectrum cap. In my opinion, there is no question that the tangible, significant benefits of retaining the cap far outweigh the purported benefits of removing it. In the sections that follow, I explain related policy matters that the Commission should consider regardless of its ultimate decision on the spectrum cap.

B. The Commission Cannot Consider the Spectrum Cap in Isolation

1. The Use of Wireless Affiliates Can Circumvent the Spectrum Cap

58. The entire debate surrounding the cap is rendered meaningless so long as the Commission endorses a “soft” cap over a “hard” cap. Stated differently, so long as the Commission allows carriers to use fronts to aggregate spectrum beyond the spectrum cap, the spectrum cap is rendered meaningless. Although several carriers used fronts in Auction #35 to subvert the spectrum cap, no firm has perfected the art of subversion quite like AT&T. For each closed, set-aside license won by Alaska Native or DCC PCS in Auction #35 that overlaps with a cellular or PCS license owned directly by AT&T, I calculated the aggregate amount of spectrum controlled directly and indirectly by AT&T. First, I used mapping software to overlay AT&T’s existing cellular and PCS footprint with the cellular and PCS footprints of American Cellular (a
joint-venture between AT&T and Dobson),\(^{48}\) the combined Telecorp PCS and Tritel (23 percent of the equity owned by AT&T),\(^{49}\) and Triton PCS.\(^{50}\) Next, I overlay the footprint of AT&T and its affiliates with the closed PCS licenses won by Alaska Native and DCC PCS in Auction #35. For each overlap region, I calculate the amount of spectrum owned directly and indirectly by AT&T. Table 4 summarizes the results.

\(^{48}\) Downloaded from Dobson’s website at [http://www.dobson.net/about_us/history_timeline.html](http://www.dobson.net/about_us/history_timeline.html).


\(^{50}\) AT&T owns roughly 78 percent of the Series A Redeemable Preferred Stock authorized by Triton PCS. See Triton PCS Inc., 1999 SEC Form 10-K (filed Mar. 30, 2000).

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*Declaration of Peter Cramton on behalf of Leap Wireless, April 13, 2001*
TABLE 4: AT&T’S DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPECTRUM HOLDINGS
IN AT&T-ALASKA NATIVE OVERLAP MARKETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AT&amp;T-Alaska Native Overlaps</th>
<th>MTA</th>
<th>Market Name</th>
<th>MHz Won in Auction</th>
<th>MHz Before Auction</th>
<th>Owned By</th>
<th>Total MHz</th>
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<td>in MTA</td>
<td>in MSA</td>
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</table>


As Table 4 shows, AT&T owns, either directly or indirectly, 65 MHz in Cincinnati (BTA 81) and Portland-Brunswick (BTA 357). AT&T owns, either directly or indirectly, 55 MHz in Melbourne, Florida (BTA 289), Orlando (BTA 336), and New Haven (BTA 318).

59. Ironically, the spectrum cap, intended to expand the set of wireless players, in fact created an extra incentive for the incumbent operators to form fronts. The fronts provide not only an entrepreneurial discount and access to the closed license, but also enable the incumbent operators to circumvent the spectrum cap. The result is a near absence of successful true entrepreneurs, as most of the closed spectrum went to fronts rather than true entrepreneurs. The

Declaration of Peter Cramton on behalf of Leap Wireless, April 13, 2001
FCC should enforce both the spectrum cap and the designated entity rules to promote competition in the mobile wireless industry.

2. The Department of Justice Cannot Be Relied Upon to Prevent Any Merger that Would Reduce Potential Competition

60. Opponents of the spectrum cap might argue that issues of concentration in the mobile telephony market are better left to the Department of Justice (DoJ). While the DoJ may prevent mergers that reduce actual competition—that is, a merger that reduces the number of carriers that are actually offering service—the DoJ will typically allow mergers that reduce potential competition—that is, a merger that reduces the number of licensees. Hence, it is erroneous to claim that the antitrust laws will protect consumers from wireless consolidation in all circumstances.

61. There are currently several broadband PCS licensees that have yet to offer wireless service. For example, each license that was awarded in Auction #35 in February 2001 is a potential acquisition target of an incumbent wireless provider. If the spectrum cap were removed, there would be almost nothing to prevent the incumbent wireless providers from acquiring the set-aside properties (that were not already acquired through fronts). The resulting degree of concentration would jeopardize the trend in lower wireless prices.

CONCLUSION

62. Leap is great evidence of the efficacy of the spectrum cap. Removal of the cap would eliminate Leap’s chances of obtaining spectrum in the secondary spectrum market, and

51. Because of the low standard associated with the construction requirement, I do not consider it to be a binding constraint in the transfer of the license from a designated entity to a non-designated entity. It is so low in
hence would deprive consumers in *every* market not yet served by Leap of the benefits of lower prices and greater choice. I have demonstrated that the benefits of maintaining the cap exceed the cost of removing the cap. Unless the Commission believes that innovative carriers such as Leap do not bring benefits to wireless consumers, it should not feel comfortable removing the spectrum cap.

I certify that the forgoing is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.


Peter Cramton