I created the following “Market Design” word cloud with a Google Scholar search “auction OR matching OR ‘market design’”. Then I eliminated words without content like the, or, and. The font size is proportional to the square-root of the word frequency. I used this as the Community Picture for the newly formed . . . → Read More: Market Design word cloud]]>  

I created the following “Market Design” word cloud with a Google Scholar search “auction OR matching OR ‘market design’”. Then I eliminated words without content like the, or, and. The font size is proportional to the square-root of the word frequency. I used this as the Community Picture for the newly formed Market Design Community on Google+.

“Medicare Auction Reform,” Testimony of Peter Cramton before the . . . → Read More: Medicare auction gets failing grade at Congressional hearing]]> After working over two years to reform the Medicare auctions for home medical equipment (supplies like oxygen and diabetes test strips), I was finally given the opportunity to testify before Congress on the matter. Below are links to my testimony, transcript, video, and further comments:

“Medicare Auction Reform,” Testimony of Peter Cramton before the United States House Committee on Small Business, 11 September 2012. [Oral Testimony, Transcript of Hearing, Video of Hearing (jump to: my oral, Q&A),  Comments of Peter Cramton]

Comments of Peter Cramton ends with the following postscript:

“Immediately following the Medicare auction hearing, I left for Washington Dulles Airport to fly to London, where I spent the rest of the week advising the United Kingdom’s Department of Energy and Climate Change on the design of the UK electricity market and the Office of Communications on the UK’s upcoming 4G spectrum auction for mobile communications.

“The contrast with my CMS experience over the last two-years was so dramatic that I thought I had been transported to an alternate universe where truth was truth and rational thought was not only valued but essential to government decision making. My three days in London were filled with tireless informed debate of the difficult issues of designing auctions in complex economic settings—electricity and telecommunications. As discussed in my testimony, I am well aware that the US government also is capable of such innovative expert decision making—my testimony gave the FCC’s spectrum auctions and FERC’s electricity markets as clear examples.

“One thing I do know: Congress and the White House must act to reform the Medicare auction. If we do not effectively apply market methods to health care, Medicare is unsustainable.”

You may recall that one month ago on June 17, President Obama received a letter from 244 concerned auction experts on the Medicare competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment, pointing out the fatal flaws in the Medicare auctions.

Since that time, I and others . . . → Read More: Medicare auctions update: video and legislation]]> Here is a quick update on the Medicare auctions.

You may recall that one month ago on June 17, President Obama received a letter from 244 concerned auction experts on the Medicare competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment, pointing out the fatal flaws in the Medicare auctions.

Since that time, I and others have had discussions with both the administration and Congressional staff to make progress on the logical next step: repeal and reform of the existing program.

Today I have posted a short 12-minute video “Medicare Auction Reform,” which describes the problems and provides a solution from leading experts. I encourage you to watch it.

I have also posted an outline of “Repeal and Reform Legislation for Medicare DME Auctions,” [pptx].

To avoid program failure, the flawed Medicare auctions must be replaced with modern efficient auctions, which yield sustainable competitive market prices.

Reform of the auctions will bring benefits to all. Medicare beneficiaries benefit from receiving the quality goods and services they need, Medicare providers benefit from being paid sustainable competitive prices for the quality goods and services they deliver, taxpayers benefit by paying the least-cost sustainable prices for these products, and CMS, the administering agency, benefits from the numerous efficiencies that result from conducting an effective program, largely free of complaint, fraud, and corruption.

For further information on the Medicare auctions see www.cramton.umd.edu/papers/health-care.

Thank you for your interest.

Kind regards,

Peter

The FCC and the Administration want to make 120 MHz of . . . → Read More: Congressional briefing on incentive auctions to re-purpose TV spectrum]]> On 23 May 2011, a Congressional briefing, “Spectrum Incentive Auctions: the Nuts, Bolts and Economics,” hosted by the Technology Policy Institute, focused on the economics of auctions and how spectrum incentive auctions should be structured to provide the most efficient outcomes for stakeholders.

The FCC and the Administration want to make 120 MHz of spectrum currently used for broadcast available for other, presumably higher-value, wireless uses.  Policymakers are proposing using voluntary auctions to encourage broadcasters to sell their licenses, but questions remain on how these incentive auctions would work in practice. The panelists and the presentations (in order of presentation) were:

• Scott Wallsten, Vice President for Research, Technology Policy Institute (moderator)
  
• Evan Kwerel, Senior Economic Advisor, Federal Communications Commission [Presentation]
  
• Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland [Presentation, pptx with animation]
• Karen Wrege, Senior Auction Consultant, Power Auctions LLC [Presentation]
• Lawrence Ausubel, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland [Presentation]
  

The event was well-covered in the trade press. Some examples are given below:

TR Daily

EXPERTS: CONGRESS SHOULD LEAVE DETAILS OF INCENTIVE AUCTIONS PLAN UP TO FCC

Congress should leave the mechanics of incentive auctions up to the FCC if it passes legislation authorizing the sales, auction experts said at a Capitol Hill event today. The experts warned lawmakers – and the Commission – against taking particular steps that they said could thwart the FCC’s hopes of reallocating 120 megahertz of TV spectrum for wireless broadband services. Several of the speakers also predicted that it would take up to two years for the FCC to complete preparation for an auction if legislation passes.

“We don’t know right now what the best way to do this [is], and we need a lot of flexibility to figure it out,” Evan Kwerel, a senior economic adviser at the FCC, said at a luncheon event sponsored by the Technology Policy Institute.

He said Congress granted the Commission such flexibility when it first authorized the agency to hold auctions in 1993, adding that the agency’s proposed plan then was “way different” than what it ended up adopting after receiving input from academic experts during “an evolutionary process.” The incentive auctions regime “will evolve through a process like it did before, which is a collaborative process” that will include consultation with industry and academia,” Mr. Kwerel said.

The other speakers at today’s event, who are experts in auction design, agreed that Congress should let the Commission set the auction rules.

“The legislation needs to be intentionally vague,” said Lawrence Ausubel, an economics professor at the University of Maryland who is also chairman and founder of Power Auctions, Inc., and president of Market Design, Inc. “There are a lot of delicate aspects of this operation, and poorly drafted legislation could simply stop this valuable program dead in its tracks.” He also said, “The FCC is very well-tuned into auction design. Congress is not.”

Mr. Ausubel offered some suggestions to lawmakers. He said the legislation should provide “explicit authority” for the Commission to hold an auction in which spectrum is both bought and sold and to relocate and repack TV licensees. He suggested the FCC could be “most vulnerable” to a legal challenge on the repacking issue. He also said the legislation should state that broadcasters that return spectrum will retain their “must carry” rights.

Peter Cramton, a University of Maryland economics professor and chairman of Market Design, suggested that there are a number of ways Congress and the FCC could hurt the prospects of incentive auctions. For Congress, lawmakers shouldn’t “impose restrictions on which broadcasters can participate in the auction,” Mr. Cramton. “That would be insane. Don’t do it,” he said. Similarly, lawmakers should not make repacking voluntary. “That would destroy the auction,” Mr. Cramton said. He also warned Congress not to “get too greedy” and try to stipulate what percentage of auction revenues must go to the U.S. Treasury.

As for the FCC, he also said it shouldn’t impose limits on stations that can participate or make repacking voluntary. He also said the FCC should ensure it addresses “competitive concerns” in the industry. Regarding the last point, he suggested the agency ensure it makes more spectrum available for unlicensed applications.

Mr. Cramton also stressed the importance of TV spectrum reallocation being a voluntary process, saying it was both more efficient as well as “politically expedient.” “The broadcast lobby has a lot of power in Washington,” he noted. Mr. Ausubel suggested the FCC could adopt “competitive preferences” in the auction to ensure it attracts smaller entrants.

Karen Wrege, a senior auction consultant for Power Auctions who managed FCC auctions for 11 years, mocked the supply and demand curves of the economists on the panel. She said broadcasters won’t need to use those to decide whether they want to sell their spectrum.

Right now, she said, “they don’t want to do this.” But if Congress passes the legislation, she said she believes stations will seriously consider if it is in their best interest. “I believe there’s a price,” she said.

But she said it is crucial for the process to be “simple for broadcasters” to understand. For example, they need to know how much they will be compensated and how repacking will work. She said the FCC should publish the repacking algorithm it uses, and ideally provide software so broadcasters can test it. The Commission should also publish pricing rules and provide software so that industry can test it. The FCC should also hold a mock auction “with a working prototype” of the repacking software, she said. “Everybody gets more comfortable when they really understand the nuts and bolts of it,” she said.

Ms. Wrege agreed that Congress should let the FCC make decisions about how the auction is designed, saying, “The legislation should leave the design details out.”

As for how long it would take for the FCC to prepare for an auction if Congress authorizes one, Mr. Cramton and Ms. Wrege suggested two years and Mr. Ausubel said 18 months to two years. Mr. Kwerel did not speculate but he said, “I don’t want to rush this thing.” He said the FCC would test the auction design first to ensure its economics were correct. He also said it might contract the auction duties to outside experts, as it has done with previous auctions.

He also provided some details of the current thinking of FCC officials on the auction’s design, which he acknowledged could change.

He said the FCC is mulling “two alternative designs” that are “essentially equivalent” in terms of the outcome.

In sequential auctions, an incentive auction would feature binding offers from broadcasters to sell spectrum and either share a channel with another broadcaster, discontinue over-the-air broadcasting, or move to an upper or VHF band channel, while a “forward” auction would feature binding bids to buy spectrum. Based on those actions, the FCC would be able to determine the amount of spectrum that could be cleared. The Commission would repack stations and winning offers would be accepted.

The goal would be to find “the least costly way to clear various amounts of contiguous spectrum” in each market, Mr. Kwerel said, which he said is “not an obvious thing.”

An alternative would be to use a double auction, in which the first three steps are done at the same time, followed by repacking, Mr. Kwerel said. He said the sequential approach is easier to do.

He also stressed that there won’t be any “mystery” about the spectrum being offered for sale by broadcasters, saying, “You’ll know everything before you actually close the deal.”

In a related development, Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R., Pa.) wrote FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski today to ask the FCC to keep the needs of TV viewers in mind as it seeks to reallocate spectrum. “Americans should not lose reliable access to quality broadcast programming as a result of spectrum policies that could reduce viewer reception of local stations,” the congressman wrote. “Similarly, they should not lose potential services because of new spectrum taxes on local stations.” – Paul Kirby,paul.kirby@wolterskluwer.com

CommDaily

Economists Say ‘Flexible’ Incentive Auctions Law Would Give Best Return

Congress should be vague in legislation authorizing voluntary incentive auctions at the FCC, said commission and outside economists and consultants at a Technology Policy Institute lunch Monday.

While the economists opposed forcing broadcasters and other holders to give up their spectrum, they said

it’s not a good idea also to make the repacking process voluntary. Some urged the FCC to address competition

in auction rules due to increasing consolidation in the wireless industry.

“We don’t know right now what the best way [is] to do” voluntary incentive auctions, said FCC

senior economic advisor Evan Kwerel. “We need a lot of flexibility [from Congress] to figure it out.”

The commission will develop rules through a “collaborative” process taking into account views of industry

and academics “to get the best design that meets the objectives that Congress sets for us,” Kwerel said.

The FCC understands auctions and is best suited to make the rules, said Karen Wrege, senior auction

consultant for Power Auctions. “The legislation should leave the design details out.” Lawrence

Ausubel, economics professor at the University of Maryland, agreed: “It’s not only easier to write vague

legislation; it’s also better. … There are a lot of delicate aspects of this operation, and poorly drafted legislation

could simply stop this valuable program dead in its tracks.”

Congress could “screw up” if legislation imposed restrictions like requiring certain types of stations

to maintain over-the-air broadcasts, said Peter Cramtom, an economics professor at the University of

Maryland. Another mistake would be to specify a percentage of auction proceeds going to the U.S. Treasury,

he said. That could “cause enormous harm” because it may force the government to withhold spectrum

from the market just so it can meet the percentage. “Since we don’t know what the supply and demand

curve looks like, Congress is in no position to make a judgment about what fraction of the revenues

should go to the Treasury,” he said.

While giving up spectrum should be voluntary, repacking should be mandatory, the economists

agreed. “It accomplishes absolutely nothing if some broadcasters express a willingness to clear and we’re

left with a checkerboard of spectrum,” said Ausubel. The FCC already has authority to force TV stations

to move “as long as they give them an equivalent channel,” Kwerel said. But Ausubel suggested placing

explicit FCC repacking authority in voluntary auctions legislation anyway. “That seems like the most vulnerable

spot where there could be lawsuits,” he said. “While I believe they already have this authority,

who knows what the court of appeals will think.”

Broadcasters will give up spectrum for the right price, said Wrege. Some broadcasters right now

may say they oppose incentive auctions “at any price” because they don’t want to move, she said. “But if

COMMUNICATIONS DAILY—8 TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2011

Congress passes this … it provides an opportunity for broadcasters to really decide whether or not it’s

worth it, whether or not there’s a price at which they would rather not do over-the-air broadcasts,” Wrege

said. “I believe there’s a price.” To encourage broadcasters, the auction process must be simple and spectrum

holders must know they will be compensated, she said.

Legislation should include a “must carry” clause saying broadcasters who give up spectrum will

not lose their right to be carried on cable and satellite networks, Ausubel said. “If anything is done to

make broadcasters hesitant about participating, it’s the fear that giving up over-the-air broadcasting is going

to have the result of forfeiting their must-carry rights on the vehicles with which people actually watch

their shows,” cable and satellite, he said.

“Basic economics” says that an AT&T/T-Mobile combination would reduce the amount of money

that Verizon and AT&T will pay for spectrum in auctions, Ausubel said. “They’re going to bid less because

there are fewer of them,” he said. To counter that, there could be “greater reliance on reserve prices in the

auction than there was in the past” and “greater need for competitive measures to encourage active bidding by

a third and fourth firm,” he said. Cramtom agreed that the FCC should address competitive issues in its auction

rules. Two carriers owned most 700 MHz spectrum, he said. “We need to have more than a duopoly.”

The FCC process to make incentive auction rules could take two years, said Cramtom and Wrege.

Kwerel refused to guess a time frame, but said the FCC will go through its normal rulemaking process. “I

don’t think we want to rush this thing,” he said. The FCC doesn’t want to be “dilatory,” but “it takes time

to do things quickly.” — Adam Bender

Politico

ECONOMIST GOES AFTER BROADCASTERS — University of Maryland economics professor Peter Cramton criticized broadcasters Monday for resisting an FCC spectrum auction, saying he hasn’t seen over-the-air TV in 25 years.

“Let’s look at the value of over-the-air TV broadcasts. They’ve been on exponential decline since about 1985. More and more consumers are getting their TV via cable and satellite. The college students, they get it through the Internet, by and large. They don’t have TV sets,” Cramton said at a Technology Policy Institute Hill event on spectrum auctions. “The value of mobile broadband is growing exponentially. It’s very obvious to everybody. Don’t believe it for a minute when a broadcaster says (an auction) is a bad idea, and that broadcast over-the-air TV is absolutely wonderful.”

‘KEEP IT SIMPLE FOR BROADCASTERS’ — Auction consultant Karen Wrege defended broadcasters’ skepticism. “Broadcasters must fully understand how they will be compensated,” she said at the event. “Why would I participate if there is some unknown? I need to know that I’m going to get my bottom line.” She urged the FCC to publish its repacking algorithm and provide software for broadcasters to test.

SPECTRUM AUCTION TEST MAY BE ON HORIZON — Wrege suggested the FCC conduct a “mock auction” with a working prototype of repacking software to give broadcasters a better idea of what an auction would look like. She also told the FCC to consider doing a pilot project, or at least test the auction in a laboratory. FCC economist Evan Kwerel seemed to agree — he later said the agency would likely do some “experimental testing” while designing an auction.

A post by Rahul Gaitonde, Deputy Editor, BroadbandBreakfast.com

WASHINGTON May 24, 2011 – The Technology Policy Institute assembled auction experts Monday to discuss the value and mechanics of proposed spectrum incentive auctions.

“Markets work best when there are rules for the market players to act within,” said Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland. “Increasingly people are getting their television service through cable and satellite making the mobile broadband market a much more valuable use for the spectrum currently held by television broadcasters.”

Voluntary incentive auctions would allow current spectrum owners to auction of part or all of their spectrum holdings and obtain a part of the proceeds.

Cramton said that any auction would allow for three possible actions on the part of the broadcasters; keep their entire spectrum holdings, sell a portion of their holdings or sell their entire holdings.

According to Cramton many broadcasters could sell half their holdings and still maintain a robust broadcast area. Using multicasting technology, broadcasters could share a single channel allowing them to transmit up to two high definition signals or five standard definition signals.

“The broadcasters do not want this right now; they feel as though they have just been forced to be moved under the DTV transition,” said Karen Wrege, Senior Auction Consultant, Power Auctions LLC. “But they will sell their holdings for a price. They know the value of their spectrum and will be able to determine through the auction if it’s worth holding on to or selling.”

Moving spectrum licenses for the purposes of improved management and better uses is not new, according to Wrege. The practice has occurred since the Federal Communications Commission began managing the radio spectrum. She also called on the Commission to ensure that the auction process is transparent, with well-established rules.

To improve the auction process, Wrege suggested that the FCC conduct a mock auction with possible participants to test out the proposed rules.

Evan Kwerel, Senior Economic Advisor at the Federal Communications Commission, approved of Wrenge’s suggestion saying that it is likely that before any auction occurs the commission will conduct a number of mock auctions in the lab.

Kwerel went on to say that, while the issue of spectrum auctions is being talked about as a quick solution to the spectrum crunch, the actual auctions would not take place for a while. The FCC – while proficient in auction design – will take many months to study the issue before any rulemaking occurs. Additionally, the comment period alone would last months.

Other panel participants estimated that it would take the Commission nearly two years from Congressional approval of auction legislation to when the auction would occur.

Lawrence Ausubel, Professor of Economics at University of Maryland called the auction a possible solution for the increasing market concentration occurring in the mobile broadband market.

“One of the primary reasons why AT&T is buying T-Mobile is to acquire more spectrum since they cannot buy it in the open market,” Ausubel said. “The auction will create a large amount of supply which will allow for the possibilities of new entrants.”

Cramton supported the idea that the auction would allow for increased competition, but observed that in most developed countries there are only three or four major operators with a handful of regional options.

Competitive Bidding Congressional Update—What You Need to Know, 11-12:30, 24 May 2011, 1539 Longworth House Office Building, sponsored by U.S. Representative Sue Myrick (R-NC).

The event is organized by former Congresswoman Nancy Johnson and myself, . . . → Read More: Congressional briefing on Medicare auction program]]> I wish to announce an important event on the Hill on Tuesday, discussing the Medicare DME Competitive Bidding Program:

Competitive Bidding Congressional Update—What You Need to Know, 11-12:30, 24 May 2011, 1539 Longworth House Office Building, sponsored by U.S. Representative Sue Myrick (R-NC).

The event is organized by former Congresswoman Nancy Johnson and myself, and includes an excellent and broad panel of experts:

Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

Tom Milam, Member, Program Advisory and Oversight Committee (PAOC), Former COO, AmMed Direct

Barbara Rogers, PAOC Member and President/CEO National Emphysema/COPD Association

Paul Gabos, Chief Financial Officer, Lincare, Round One Re-Bid Winner [on Video]

Robert Brandt, Owner, City Medical Services, Round One Re-Bid Winner

Congresswoman Sue Myrick (R-NC) will provide comments.

The event will present a frank and honest assessment of the DME competitive bidding program. Hill staffers and Representatives will learn about the fatal flaws in the program. The briefing will include a diversity of viewpoints. Barbara Rogers, a PAOC member, is a knowledgeable and articulate advocate for Medicare beneficiaries, a voice that too often goes unheard until there’s a train wreck. Paul Gabos and Robert Brandt both represent DME providers who were winners in the Round One (Rebid). We chose winners to speak to be clear that the remarks are not “sour grapes” from auction losers.

Over the last nine months, I have learned that CMS requires more direction from Congress on the DME program. Congress must insist, through legislation, that CMS conduct efficient auctions consistent with best practice and science. The auctions must be transparent and an Independent Market Monitor must observe all aspects of the market and report directly to the Secretary of Health and Human Services about potential problems and solutions.

The current CMS auction approach is a scandal now and ultimately will be a train wreck. The only reason we have not seen the train wreck yet is that CMS has almost complete flexibility to set prices in the current system. But make no mistake: these prices are arbitrary and unrelated to providers’ costs. It is absurd for CMS to claim that “all is well” given such a process. Yet that is what they have done in the nine months since I first looked at the Medicare competitive bidding program.

The stakes are enormously high. Congress must insist on fundamental reform. Fortunately, auction experts in collaboration with industry and other stakeholders can easily develop an efficient auction process in this setting. This was demonstrated at the Medicare Auction Conference held at the University of Maryland on 1 April 2011. Congress simply needs to insist that CMS use efficient auction methods.

Later in the afternoon, I will give a briefing for Senate staff:

Briefing for Senate Staff on the Impact of the CMS Competitive Bidding Program for Durable Medical Equipment, Russell Senate Office Building, 24 May 2011.

My presentation for both events are available here:

Medicare Auction Update, University of Maryland, 24 May 2011 [pptx with animation]

As background you may want to see the video that provides some highlights from the Medicare Auction Conference that was held at the University of Maryland on 1 April 2011:

Summary video of conference highlights (35 minutes)

A wealth of additional background information is available at http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers/health-care/.

For those who cannot attend, the briefing will be posted on my web site later in the week.

Dear PAOC Members:

On 5 April 2011, you met at CMS headquarters in Baltimore to examine the status of the Medicare competitive bidding program. I was grateful that the meeting was open to the public and that I had an opportunity to meet many of you. I . . . → Read More: PAOC meeting on Medicare competitive bidding: The train wreck hasn’t happened yet]]>

Program Advisory and Oversight Committee (PAOC)

Dear PAOC Members:

On 5 April 2011, you met at CMS headquarters in Baltimore to examine the status of the Medicare competitive bidding program. I was grateful that the meeting was open to the public and that I had an opportunity to meet many of you. I was also grateful that I had an opportunity to voice my views. Some of you asked if I would put my comments in writing, so that it could be part of the public record. That is the purpose of this letter.

We learned from presentations by CMS that the train wreck predicted by auction experts and others has not yet occurred. The program was implemented in nine regions beginning 1 January 2011. Part of the reason is that it takes some time for inventories to run out, for companies to go out of business, and other indicators of failure to appear. Ninety days is too short a time to see the impact of a poor market design, especially given the grandfathering rules for continued service.

In addition, despite the fact that low-ball bidding, predicted by theory, was rampant (according to numerous bidder reports), the prices that came out of the auction’s bizarre pricing rule were made more reasonable by CMS’ manipulation of quantities. CMS can and did change the slope of the supply curve and hence the set of bids that were included in the median price. This non-transparent manipulation allows CMS to set nearly any price between the lowest and highest bid. Also, bids are already constrained by a floor and a ceiling. The “auction” is really not an auction at all, but an arbitrary pricing mechanism.

Despite the absence of a train wreck in the first 90 days, please do not sit back and conclude that all is well. One can think back on the early years of the California electricity market. Despite its poor design, the market appeared to work perfectly for more than two years before the market was stressed in late 2000 and crashed in crisis in 2001. The poor market design cost California tens of billions. The stakes are even higher here.

My comments during the public comment period are summarized in

“Public Comments of Peter Cramton at PAOC Meeting on Medicare DME Competitive Bidding Program,” 5 April 2011.

I have attached the comments, which are brief and to the point.

My final comment has to do with the creation of an independent market monitor. The market monitor is distinct from the PAOC and serves a different role. The market monitor has access to all the data available to CMS including confidential data. The market monitor is an expert in market design and in the Medicare DME market in particular. The market monitor is hired by and reports to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. The use of an independent market monitor is standard practice in complex markets like electricity markets. The approach has been adopted by all electricity markets in the United States. The market monitor brings valuable expertise. Market problems are more quickly identified and addressed with the use of a market monitor as an independent check. The market monitor has the responsibility to advise the Secretary, the PAOC, CMS and the public on the market. The market monitor has the responsibility to periodically report on the state of the market, typically quarterly. The market monitor does not make decisions with respect to the market. Decisions are made by CMS and the Secretary. The market monitor’s role is limited to advice and reporting.

Again, it was a pleasure meeting you in Baltimore. I hope my comments are helpful to the PAOC as we move toward the critical development of Round 2. My view is that it is essential to open the regulation to change. Pushing forward with the status quožan auction design that all experts agree is fatally flawedžwould be irresponsible. If you disagree with this sentence, then I urge you to study carefully the information on http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers/health-care/. There is a wealth of independent and objective expert information there. As you can tell, I am a huge fan of transparency.

Many thanks for your public service.

Kind regards,

Peter Cramton

Copenhagen Business School Denmark

Workshop and Summer School organized by CFEM, Center for Research in the Foundations of Electronic Markets

New Trends in Mechanism Design will bring together researchers from economics and computer science working on the design and analysis of economic mechanisms and on applications of such mechanism to solve . . . → Read More: New trends in mechanism design]]> 5-9 September 2011

Copenhagen Business School
Denmark

Workshop and Summer School organized by
CFEM, Center for Research in the Foundations of Electronic Markets

New Trends in Mechanism Design will bring together researchers from economics and computer science working on the design and analysis of economic mechanisms and on applications of such mechanism to solve real-life economic problems for companies, organizations and governments. The workshop will cover both the design of mechanisms using game theoretical analysis of incentives, and the calibration of mechanisms using experimental techniques. A main focus of the workshop will be contributions from computer science to the field of mechanism design. Over the last decade, such contributions have intensified due to the challenges raised by new application domains in the age of the Internet, in some case leading to exciting new theoretical models. The applications considered at the workshop include (but are not restricted to) auctions, including procurement auctions, combinatorial auctions, sale of digital goods, online advertising, virtual sales of production and storage capacity, pricing and tariff schemes, cost allocation mechanisms, matching systems, regulatory mechanisms like yardstick competition, and benchmarking.

The workshop will be organized with only one stream of presentations. The presentations will include talks from leading invited scholars, a limited number of contributed long talks, as well as two sessions with contributed short (5-10 minutes) presentations of key ideas and findings and panel discussions on key challenges. A tutorial on mechanism design for students and other newcomers to the field is held in the beginning of the week. The program will allow for plenty of interaction between participants.

To submit a talk (long or short) for consideration, send an abstract or a full paper by email tocfem@cs.au.dk before 1 May 2011. The notification date is 1 July 2011.

Registration for the workshop begins 1 June 2011 at www.cfem.dk.

Confirmed keynote speakers:
Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
Uriel Feige, the Weizmann Institute
Jason Hartline, Northwestern University
Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University
Herve Moulin, Rice University
Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University

Scientific organizers:
Peter Bogetoft, Copenhagen Business School
Peter Bro Miltersen, Aarhus University

1. Al Roth’s (together with Peter Coles’) Market Design blog. This blog started in 2008. It is especially strong on matching market applications, such as kidney exchanges, school choice, and hospital-medical-student matching.

2. Noam Nisan’s Algorithmic Game-Theory/Economics blog. This blog started . . . → Read More: Other market design blogs]]> There are several active blogs on market design. Two of the best are:

1. Al Roth’s (together with Peter Coles’) Market Design blog. This blog started in 2008. It is especially strong on matching market applications, such as kidney exchanges, school choice, and hospital-medical-student matching.

2. Noam Nisan’s Algorithmic Game-Theory/Economics blog. This blog started in 2009. As the name suggests, the focus is algorithmic game theory and economics. In my terms it is market design with a computer science spin.

I welcome your comments and interest.

Peter Cramton