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Economics 703: Advanced Microeconomics

Professor Peter Cramton

Tuesday and Thursday, 9:30 am to 10:45 am, Tydings 0111, Fall 2007

Presents a formal treatment of game theory. We begin with extensive-form games. A game tree is defined, as well as information sets and pure, mixed and behavioral strategies. Existence of Nash equilibria is discussed. We then turn to the analysis of dynamic games, covering repeated games, finitely repeated games, the folk theorem for repeated games, subgame perfection, and punishment strategies. Next, games with incomplete information are studied, including direct revelation games, concepts of efficiency, and information transmission. Several refinements of Nash equilibria are defined, such as sequential equilibria and stable equilibria. The analysis of enduring relationships and reputations is covered. The course concludes with a discussion of two important applications of game theory: auctions and bargaining. The topics include sealed-bid auctions, open auctions, private valuation and common valuation models, the winner's curse, auction design, bargaining with incomplete information, and combinatorial auctions.

Please note the following Class Schedule Changes. Double classes start at 8:10am!

No Class on the Following Days
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Thursday, October 25, 2007
Thursday, November 01, 2007
Thursday, November 08, 2007
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
Thursday, November 29, 2007
Thursday, December 06, 2007
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Double Class on the Following Days
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
Tuesday, October 09, 2007
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
Tuesday, November 06, 2007
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Tuesday, December 04, 2007

Course Materials

Web exercises can be found at http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/student/. You log in with the course number 1268 and your email address. The class password is c2Io. It is case sensitive. Web exercises we have completed so far have active links below:

Web Exercise 1    Web Exercise 2    Web Exercise 3    Web Exercise 4    Web Exercise 5

Lecture Notes Slides
  1. Foundations
  2. Dynamics
  3. Mechanism Design
  4. Refinement
  5. Signaling
  6. Auctions, Reputations, and Bargaining
  7. Demand Reduction
  8. Optimality of Being Efficient
  9. Clock-Proxy Auction
  10. Combinatorial Auctions
  1. Foundations
  2. Dynamics
  3. Mechanism Design
  4. Refinement
  5. Signaling
  6. Auctions, Reputations, and Bargaining
  7. Demand Reduction
  8. Optimality of Being Efficient
  9. Clock-Proxy Auction
  10. Practical Auction Design
Problem Sets Problem Set Answers
  1. Problem Set 1  due Sep 11
  2. Problem Set 2  due Sep 25
  3. Problem Set 3  due Oct 2
  4. Problem Set 4  due Oct 30
  5. Problem Set 5  due Nov 6
  6. Problem Set 6  due Nov 13
  7. Problem Set 7  due Nov 20
  8. Problem Set 8  not assigned
  9. Problem Set 9  due Dec 4 (problems 1-3 only)
  10. Problem Set 10 due Dec 4 (note change!)
  1. Answers 1
  2. Answers 2
  3. Answers 3
  4. Answers 4
  5. Answers 5
  6. Answers 6
  7. Answers 7
  8. Answers 8
  9. Answers 9
  10. Answers 10

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