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Syllabus: Economics 603, Microeconomic Analysis I (second-half)

Professor Peter Cramton

Economics 603 is the first half of the Economics Departments two-semester core sequence in Microeconomics. This course is taken by all first-year Economics Ph.D. students, as well as by quite a few Ph.D. students in Agricultural & Resource Economics, the Smith School of Business, and other academic departments. The first half of the semester treats consumer theory and the theory of the firm. The second half of the semester is an introduction to game theory and its applications in economics. The first half of this course will be taught by Professor Daniel R. Vincent. The second half will be taught by Professor Peter Cramton.

Course announcements, problem sets, and handouts will be posted at:

http://www.cramton.umd.edu/econ603/economics-603-microeconomics.htm

There will be about 6 problem sets for the second half of the course.

The final exam—for both the morning and afternoon sections—is scheduled for Thursday December 15, from 8:00 – 10:00 am, Tawes Hall 1154.  


Texts

A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J. Green (henceforth “MWG”), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.

R. Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton Univ. Press, 1992 (paperback).


Course Times

Section 0201: Tuesday/Thursday 11:00 am - 12:15 pm, Tydings 1114

Section 0101: Tuesday/Thursday 2:00 pm - 3:15 pm, Tydings 2111

Discussion Section 0101: Wednesday 3:30 pm - 5:15 pm, Tydings 2111

Discussion Section 0201: Friday 12 noon - 1:45 pm, Tydings 2111

Teaching Assistant: Daniel Aromi mailto:pang@econ.umd.edu


Office Hours

Professor Cramton’s Office Hours: Tuesdays, 7:30 - 9:30 am, Tydings 4101A

Daniel Aromi’s Office Hours: Thursdays, 3:30 – 4:30 pm, and Fridays, 2:00 - 3:00 pm, Tydings 4128C


Topics for Second Half of Course

  1. Oligopoly and Static Games of Complete Information

    Gibbons, chapter 1

    MWG, pp. 943-953 (continuity, compactness, correspondences and fixed-point theorems)

    MWG, pp. 383-400 (especially pp. 395-400)

    Tirole, J., “Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competition,” chapter 7 of The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988

    [For a second reading (e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 217-253 and 260-261.]

    Problem Sets #7-8 Assigned

     

  2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information

    Gibbons, chapter 2

    Rubinstein, A., “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 1982, 97-109

    [For a second reading (e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 267-282, 296-299, and 400-423.]

     

    Supplemental reading:

    Binmore, K., “Making Deals,” chapter 5 of Fun and Games, D.C. Heath & Co., 1992

    Coase, R., “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1960

    Problem Sets #9-10 Assigned

     

  3. Static Games of Incomplete Information

    Gibbons, chapter 3

    Ausubel, L. (2003), “Auction Theory for the New Economy” (short survey aimed toward grad students)

    [For a second reading (e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 253-260.]

     

    Supplemental reading:

    Milgrom, P., “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1989, 3-22

    Ashenfelter, O., “How Auctions Work for Wine and Art,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1989, 23-36

    Vickrey, W., “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance, 1961, 8-37

    Ausubel, L., “An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” American Economic Review, forthcoming

    Cramton, P., “The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Fall 1997, 431-495

    Problem Sets #11-12 Assigned

     

  4. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

    Gibbons, chapter 4

    Spence, A.M., “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 355-374

    [For a second reading (e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 282-296 and 436-460.]

     

  5. Search Costs and Switch Costs

    Diamond, P., “A Model of Price Adjustment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1971, 156-168

    Klemperer, P., “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 375-394

    Ausubel, L., “The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market,” American Economic Review, 1991, 50-81


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