This is the web page for my course on Auctions and Market Design co-taught with Dirk Bergemann. It also includes four lectures from the course, Economic Engineering, which I co-teach with Axel Ockenfels and Alex Westkamp. Students are encouraged to take both courses for a broad introduction in Market Design.
Market design combines auction and matching theory with behavioral and experimental economics to design innovative markets to better meet goals. Applications are seen in almost all markets and government programs that assign and sometimes price scarce resources. Market design research leads to a better understanding of the incentives that guide behavior. Applications include matching students to schools, interns to hospitals, and kidneys to patients. In settings where prices are used to motivate behavior, auction markets are developed to assign and price scarce resources. Applications include markets in mobile communications, electricity, financial securities, transportation, and emissions.
Market design takes as given that participants interact in the market to maximize their objectives given the market rules. The question we ask is, “Are the market rules best-suited to the market’s objectives or can they be improved?” This is an important and practical question. In nearly all cases, market rules can be improved and often the improvements can transform entire industries for the better.
Congratulations to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson, two auction theorists and market designers, who received the 2020 Nobel Prize in economics “for improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats.” [Scientific background] This course has benefited tremendously from their contributions to auctions and market design.
Economic Engineering Lectures [Cramton slides]
Lecture 3: Mechanism design [2h19m]
Our first lecture presents an introduction to auctions and market design. Chen, Cramton, Ockenfels, and List (2020) presents a survey of recent work. For discussion of market design, see Roth (2002, 2015, 2018). For the initial paper on matching, see Gale and Shapley (1962). For matching with contracts, see Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), which nicely connects main results in auctions and matching. Bichler (2017) presents a nice introduction to market design from a linear programming perspective. Good textbooks on game theory are Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Gibbons (1992), and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). More recent work on algorithmic game theory is in Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani (2008). Parkes and Seuken (2021) is the first textbook on economics and computation. For textbooks on optimization, see Nocedal and Wright (2006) and Kochenderfer and Wheeler (2019).
McAfee (2017) covers the standard auctions in a fun 14-minute video. McAfee and McMillan (1987) is the seminal survey on auctioning a single item. Krishna (2009) provides an excellent treatment of auction theory. Vickrey (1961) is the pathbreaking paper on auctions, focusing on private values. Wilson (1967, 1969) introduces common value auctions. Milgrom and Weber (1982) generalize auction theory to affiliated values. Akbarpour and Li (2020) provide a nice rationale for some of the standard auctions. Cramton (1998) provides reasons ascending auctions perform well. Bergemann, Breuer, Cramton, and Ockenfels (2021) explore how a soft reserve price can capture the benefits of both ascending and sealed-bid auctions.
The seminal paper is Myerson (1981). Borgers (2015) provides an excellent treatment of mechanism design. Vohra (2011) presents mechanism design from a linear programming perspective. Hartline and Lucier (2015) and Camara, Hartline, and Johnsen (2020) focus on algorithmic approaches that work well in a variety of environments.
Much of the material is in Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek, and Weretka (2014). Ausubel and Cramton (2004) present the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing. Ausubel and Cramton (2001) discuss revenue maximizing auctions with resale.
Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) provides the basic results on position auctions. Varian (2007) covers similar ground with a different solution concept. Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 23, remains one of the best treatments of mechanism design and incentives. Nisan, Tardos, and Vazirani (2008), chapter 28, gives an insightful introduction with a more algorithmic perspective on the generalized second-price auction.
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2020) provides the basic results on common value auctions. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2019) gives a novel perspective on the revenue equivalence theorem. Bulow and Klemperer (2002) is a splendid and transparent introduction into the new insights that arise in common value auctions. Bulow and Klempeer (1996) is an excellent treatment of optimal auctions with interdependent values and more.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) provide the basic results on Bayesian persuasion and information design. Bergemann and Morris (2019) provide a survey of this growing area of research and generalizations to strategic settings.
Bergemann and Valimaki (2010) provide basic results on dynamic mechanism design from an efficiency perspective. Bergemann and Valimaki (2019) provide a survey of the efficiency results over the last decade.
Courty and Li (2000) provide basic results on dynamic mechanism design from a revenue perspective. Borgers (2015) is an excellent reference on mechanism design. Chapter 11 covers much of the material presented here.
Coase (1959) is the first paper arguing for spectrum auctions. His testimony before Congress is wonderful; Cramton (2012) provides another example of Congressional testimony but on Medicare auctions. For an excellent discussion of spectrum auctions, see Milgrom (2004). Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (2006) cover combinatorial auctions. Cramton (2013) and Day and Cramton (2012) covers much of the material here. On bid signaling, see Cramton and Schwartz (2000). Cramton and Ockenfels (2017) provide a more recent treatment focusing on the German auctions. Open access wireless markets are presented in Cramton and Doyle (2017). Harchol et al. (2020) presents a similar idea for the internet backbone.
Electricity market design is discussed in Cramton (2017). The electricity transition is studied in Cramton, Bobbio, Malec, and Sujarittanonta (2020). Climate policy is discussed in Cramton, MacKay, Ockenfels, and Stoft (2017) and MacKay, Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (2015). Foundational research on engineering trust is presented in Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels (2013).
Transportation is discussed in Cramton, Geddes, and Ockenfels (2017). The arms race for speed is studied in Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015). Flow trading is explored in Budish, Cramton, Kyle, Lee, and Malec (2021). Rostek and Yoon (2020) provide an excellent survey of financial market models. An interesting application of matching with prices in an artificial currency is Budish, Cachon, Kessler, and Othman (2017). Cramton, Ockenfels, Roth, and Wilson (2020) provide another example using both real and artificial currency to motivate supply and efficient allocation of scarce medical resources. Duffie (2020) argues for central clearing in the Treasury market—the paper is presented at CAFIN with questions from Cramton and others.
Akbarpour, Mohammad and Shengwu Li (2020) “Credible Auctions,” Econometrica, 88, 425-467.
Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton (2001) “The Optimality of Being Efficient,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.
Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton (2004) “Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing,” Economic Theory, 23, 493-505.
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek, and Marek Weretka (2014) “Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 81:4, 1366-1400.
Bergemann, Dirk, Kevin Breuer, Peter Cramton, and Axel Ockenfels (2021) “How Softening an Auction Reserve Price Not Only Increases Efficiency But Also Revenues,” Working Paper, University of Cologne.
Bergemann, Dirk and Juuso Valimaki (2010) “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism,” Econometrica, 78, 771-790.
Bergemann, Dirk and Juuso Valimaki (2019) “Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction,” Journal of Economic Literature, 57, 235-274.
Bergemann, Dirk and Stephen Morris (2019) “Information Design: A Unified Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature, 57, 44-95.
Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris (2015) “The Limits of Price Discrimination,” American Economic Review, 105, 921-957.
Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris (2017) “First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenues,” Econometrica, 85, 107-143.
Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris (2019) “Revenue Guarantee Equivalence,” American Economic Review, 109, 1911-1929.
Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris (2020) “Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model,” Theoretical Economics, 15, 1399-1434.
Bichler, Martin (2017) Market Design: A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching, Cambridge University Press.
Bolton, Gary E., Ben Greiner, and Axel Ockenfels (2013) “Engineering Trust – Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information,” Management Science, 59, 265-285.
Borgers, Tilman (2015) An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press.
Budish, Eric, Gérard P. Cachon, Judd B. Kessler, and Abraham Othman (2017) “Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation,” Operations Research, 65, 314-336.
Budish, Eric, Peter Cramton, Albert S. Kyle, Jeongmin Lee, and David Malec (2021) “Flow Trading” Working Paper, University of Cologne.
Budish, Eric, Peter Cramton, and John Shim (2015) “The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130:4, 1547–1621. [Presentation]
Bulow, Jeremy and John Roberts (1989) “The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1060-1090.
Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer (1996) “Auctions vs Negotiations,” American Economic Review, 86, 180-194.
Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer (2002) “Prices and the Winner’s Curse,” Rand Journal of Economics, 33, 1-21.
Camara, Modibo, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen (2020) “Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior,” Working Paper, Northwestern University.
Chen, Yan, Peter Cramton, John A. List, and Axel Ockenfels (2020) “Market Design, Human Behavior and Management,” Management Science, forthcoming, 2020.
Coase, Ronald H. (1959) “The Federal Communications Commission,” Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 1-40.
Courty, Pascal and Li Hao (2000) “Sequential Screening,” Review of Economics Studies, 67, 697-717.
Cramton, Peter (1998) “Ascending Auctions,” European Economic Review, 42:3-5, 745-756.
Cramton, Peter (2012) “Medicare Auction Reform,” Testimony of Peter Cramton before the United States House Committee on Small Business, 11 September 2012. [Oral Testimony, Video of Hearing (jump to: my oral, Q&A)]
Cramton, Peter (2013) “Spectrum Auction Design,” Review of Industrial Organization, 42:2, 161-190.
Cramton, Peter, Emmanuele Bobbio, David Malec, and Pat Sujarittanonta (2020) “Electricity Markets in Transition: A multi-decade micro-model of entry and exit in advanced wholesale markets” Working Paper, University of Cologne. [1-hour talk at Texas PUC]
Cramton, Peter and Linda Doyle (2017) “Open Access Wireless Markets” Telecommunications Policy, 41, 379-390.
Cramton, Peter, R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels (2019) “Using Technology to Eliminate Traffic Congestion,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 175, 126-139.
Cramton, Peter, David JC MacKay, Axel Ockenfels and Steven Stoft (2017) Global Carbon Pricing—The Path to Climate Cooperation, MIT Press.
Cramton, Peter and Axel Ockenfels (2017) “The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behaviour,” Economic Journal, 127, F305-F324.
Cramton, Peter, Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E. Roth, and Robert B. Wilson (2020) “Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed,” Nature, 18 June.
Cramton, Peter and Jessie Schwartz (2000) “Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 229-252.
Cramton, Peter, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (2006) Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press.
Day, Robert and Peter Cramton (2012) “Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions” Operations Research, 60:3, 588-603.
Duffie, Darrell (2020) “Still the World’s Safe Haven? Redesigning the U.S. Treasury Market After the Covid-19 Crisis,” Hutchins Center Working Paper, Brookings Institution.
Edelman, Ben, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz (2007) “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,” American Economic Review, 97, 242-259.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991) Game Theory, MIT Press.
Gale, Douglas and Lloyd Shapley (1962) “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
Gibbons, Robert (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.
Harchol, Yotam, Dirk Bergemann, Nick Feamster, Eric Friedman, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Aurojit Panda, Sylvia Ratnasamy, Michael Schapira, and Scott Shenker (2020) “A Public Option for the Core,” in Annual conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication, SIGCOMM’20.
Hartline, Jason D., and Brendan Lucier (2015) “Non-Optimal Mechanism Design,” American Economic Review, 105, 3102-3124.
Hatfield, John William and Paul R. Milgrom (2005) “Matching with Contracts,” American Economic Review, 95, 913-935.
Kamenica, Emir and Matthew Gentzkow (2011) “Bayesian Persuasion,” American Economic Review, 101, 2590-2615.
Kochenderfer, Mykel J. and Tim A. Wheeler (2019) Algorithms for Optimization, MIT Press.
Krishna, Vijay (2009) Auction Theory, Academic Press, Second Edition.
MacKay, David, Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels and Steven Stoft (2015) “Price Carbon—I will if you will,” Nature, 526, 315-316, 15 October.
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D Whinston, and Jerry R. Green (1995) Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
McAfee, R. Preston (2017) The Ideal Auction, Numberphile (YouTube video).
McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan (1987) “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature, 25, 699-738.
Milgrom, Paul (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.
Milgrom, Paul and Robert J. Weber (1982) “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122.
Myerson, Roger B. (1981) “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 58-73.
Nisan, N. Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and V Vazirani (2008) Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Nocedal, Jorge and Stephen J. Wright (2006) Numerical Optimization, Second Edition, Springer New York.
Osborne, Martin and Ariel Rubinstein (1994) A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.
Parkes, David C. and Sven Seuken (2021) Economics and Computation, Cambridge University Press.
Rostek, Marzena and Ji Hee Yoon (2020) “Equilibrium Theory of Financial Markets: Recent Developments,” Working Paper, University of Wisconsin.
Roth, Alvin E. (2002) “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics,” Econometrica, 70:4, 1341–1378.
Roth, Alvin E. (2015), Who Gets What and Why, HarperCollins, UK, Ch. 3, 8, and 9.
Roth, Alvin E. (2018) “Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design,” American Economic Review, 108, 1609-1658.
Varian, Hal (2007) “Position Auctions,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25, 1163-1178.
Vickrey, William (1961) “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed-Tenders,” Journal of Finance, 16, 8-37.
Vohra, Rakesh V. (2011) Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach, Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, Robert B. (1967) “Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information,” Management Science, 13, 816-820.
Wilson, Robert B. (1969) “Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information,” Management Science, 15, 446-448.