Economics 703: Advanced Microeconomics [Syllabus]
Instructors: David Malec and Lixin Ye
Tuesday and Thursday, 9:30 am to 10:45 am, Tydings 0111, Fall 2015
Presents a formal treatment of game theory, and then introduces market design. The game theory portion covers foundations, dynamic games, games with incomplete information, mechanism design and signaling. Then we turn to market design. Market design combines behavioral and experimental economics with auction and matching theory to design innovative markets. Applications are seen in almost all markets and government programs that attempt to assign and sometimes price scarce resources. Market design research leads to better understanding of the incentives that guide behavior. Then the incentives can be designed to better achieve goals. Applications include matching students to schools, interns to hospitals, and kidneys to patients. In settings where prices are used to motivate behavior, auctions have been developed to assign and price scarce resources. Applications include the assignment of radio spectrum for mobile communications, the allocation of emission allowances, electricity market design to price and allocate wholesale electricity, and financial market microstructure to trade financial securities.
Changes to Regular Class Schedule
It may occasionally be necessary to cancel a lecture; lost lecture time will be made up via a double-length class starting at 8:10am. Any such adjustments to the lecture schedule will be listed here.
The lecture notes, slides, problem sets, and answers for the course will be available below.
We will primarily follow lectures notes by Peter Cramton; initial versions of the slides will be updated to match those used in lecture as the course continues, and will be annotated as such below.
|Problem Sets||Problem Set Answers|