Economics 703: Advanced Microeconomics [Syllabus]
Instructor: David Malec
Tuesday and Thursday, 9:30 am to 10:45 am, Tydings 0111, Fall 2016
Presents a formal treatment of game theory, and then introduces selected topics in mechanism and market design. The game theory portion covers foundations, dynamic games, games with incomplete information, mechanism design and signaling. Then we turn to selected topics in market and advanced mechanism design. Market design combines behavioral and experimental economics with auction and matching theory to design innovative markets. Applications are seen in almost all markets and government programs that attempt to assign and sometimes price scarce resources. Market design research leads to better understanding of the incentives that guide behavior. Then the incentives can be designed to better achieve goals. In settings where prices are used to motivate behavior, auctions have been developed to assign and price scarce resources. Possible topics include the assignment of radio spectrum for mobile communications, electricity market design to price and allocate wholesale electricity, mechanisms for routing traffic, approximation in mechanism design, and alternative approaches to characterizing agent behavior (e.g. price of anarchy).
Changes to Regular Class Schedule
It may occasionally be necessary to cancel a lecture; lost lecture time will be made up via a double-length class starting at 8:00am. Any such adjustments to the lecture schedule will be listed here.
- Tu, Sept 20: double lecture (8am-10:45am)
- Th, Sept 22: no lecture
- Tu, Sept 27: double lecture (8am-10:45am)
- Th, Sept 29: no lecture
The lecture notes, slides, and problem sets for the course will be available below.
|Problem Sets||Problem Set Answers|
|1. Problem Set 1 (out 10/4/2016, due 10/13/2016)||
Will be posted on the GRACE page for the course (see below)
Lecture notes by Bill Sandholm, problem set solutions, and other materials will be posted to the GRACE page for the course (link: http://go.umd.edu/isg). Access to this page requires logging in with your UID credentials, and is limited to currently enrolled students.