Professor Peter Cramton
Economics Department
University of Maryland
College Park MD
20742-7211
240-396-1043
pcramton@gmail.com
www.cramton.umd.edu
Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and Chairman of Market Design Inc. His research focuses on auctions, bargaining, and market exchange. Most of his recent work has addressed design and incentive questions in auctions and bargaining. He has served as an auction expert for numerous companies in spectrum auctions and electricity auctions. He has advised the FCC and several foreign governments on the design and implementation of spectrum auctions. Cramton has designed electricity markets in New England, Colombia, France, and Belgium. Before joining the Maryland faculty in 1993, he was an Associate Professor at Yale University and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He has published numerous articles on auction theory, auction practice, and bargaining in major journals. Cramton received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.
This web site includes a collection of papers by Peter Cramton and his co-authors. The main topics are auctions and bargaining, including both theoretical and empirical studies. The bargaining papers focus on the role of time and information in bargaining. Applications include union contract negotiations. The auction papers are primarily concerned with auction design, especially in spectrum markets, electricity markets, and treasury markets. All papers are available in pdf format. Published papers are copyrighted by the publisher. Users may make a single copy of published papers for educational purposes.
This Google Scholar link will display much of my work together with citations (but not citations that misspell my name).
Warrantees in Contracts Made by Peter Cramton
Keywords: auction, bargaining, cramton, peter cramton, auction strategy, bidding strategy, vickrey auctions, combinatorial auction, package auction, package bidding, spectrum auction, electricity auction, market design, exchange, markets, auction theory, bargaining theory, negotiation, dispute resolution, incentives, contract theory, game theory, decision theory, industrial organization, economic theory, law and economics, collusive bidding, demand reduction, quantity reduction, ascending auctions, efficient auctions, package bidding, combinatorial bidding, takeovers, initial public offerings, synergies, pcs, fcc, auction research, collective bargaining, union contract negotiations, strike replacements, bargaining with uncertainty, shrewd bargaining, dissolving a partnership, labor disputes, honesty in negotiation, sequential bargaining, strategic behavior, maryland, stanford, cornell, crampton.
Page description: Peter Cramton, University of Maryland and Market Design Inc. Research on auctions, bargaining, negotiation, auction design, spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, game theory, bidding strategy.