[ Home ] [ Auction ] [ Bargaining ] [ Other ] [ Album ] [ Courses ] [ Links ] [ Vita ] [ Workshop ]

Professor Peter Cramton Economics, Tydings Hall University of Maryland College Park MD 20742-7211 pcramton@gmail.com   www.cramton.umd.edu +1 240-396-1043

Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Since 1983, he has conducted research on auction theory and practice. This research appears in the leading economics journals. The main focus is the design of auctions for many related items. Applications include spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, and treasury auctions. On the practical side, he is Chairman of Market Design Inc., an economics consultancy founded in 1995, focusing on the design of auction markets. Since 2001, he has played a lead role in the design and implementation of electricity auctions in France and Belgium, gas auctions in Germany, and the world’s first auction for greenhouse gas emissions held in the UK in 2002. He has advised numerous governments on market design and has advised dozens of bidders in high-stake auction markets. Since 1997, he has advised ISO New England on electricity market design and was a lead designer of New England’s forward capacity auction. He led the design of electricity and gas markets in Colombia, including the Firm Energy Market, the Forward Energy Market, and the Long-term Gas Market. Since June 2006, he played a leading role in the design and development of Ofcom’s spectrum auctions in the UK. He has advised the UK, the US, and Australia on greenhouse gas auction design. He led the development of the FAA’s airport slot auctions for the New York City airports. He received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.

This web site includes a collection of papers by Peter Cramton and his co-authors. The main topics are auctions, market design, and bargaining, including both theoretical and empirical studies. The auction and market design papers are primarily concerned with auction design, especially in spectrum markets, electricity markets, and treasury markets. The bargaining papers focus on the role of time and information in bargaining. Applications include union contract negotiations. All papers are available in pdf format.  Published papers are copyrighted by the publisher. Users may make a single copy of published papers for educational purposes.

My vita in pdf is here. This Google Scholar link displays much of my work together with citations (but not citations that misspell my name). My research is also available at http://works.bepress.com/cramton/. My experience with spectrum auctions is summarized here.

Warrantees in Contracts Made by Peter Cramton

Keywords: auction, bargaining, cramton, peter cramton, auction strategy, bidding strategy, vickrey auctions, combinatorial auction, package auction, package bidding, spectrum auction, electricity auction, market design, exchange, markets, auction theory, bargaining theory, negotiation, dispute resolution, incentives, contract theory, game theory, decision theory, industrial organization, economic theory, law and economics, collusive bidding, demand reduction, quantity reduction, ascending auctions, efficient auctions, package bidding, combinatorial bidding, takeovers, initial public offerings, synergies, pcs, fcc, auction research, collective bargaining, union contract negotiations, strike replacements, bargaining with uncertainty, shrewd bargaining, dissolving a partnership, labor disputes, honesty in negotiation, sequential bargaining, strategic behavior, maryland, stanford, cornell, crampton.

Page description: Peter Cramton, University of Maryland and Market Design Inc. Research on auctions, bargaining, negotiation, auction design, spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, game theory, bidding strategy.

[ Home ] [ Auction ] [ Bargaining ] [ Other ] [ Album ] [ Courses ] [ Links ] [ Vita ] [ Workshop ]